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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 14,720

MICHAEL DON PETERSON,
Defendant and
Appellant.
---0000000---

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
---0000000---

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The Appellant, Michael Don Peterson, appeals from
a judgment entered against him in the Fourth· Judicial
District Court of Utah, the Honorable George E. Ballif,
presiding, following a conviction for Forcible Sexual
Abuse.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was found guilty in June, 1976, of
Forcible Sexual Abuse in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§76-5-404 (1953) in that he, the said Michael 9on
Peterson, on the night of March 24, 1976, in Orem, Utah,
touched the genitals of another and did otherwise take
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indecent liberties with another, without the consent
of the other, with intent to arouse or gratify the
sexual desire of the said Michael Don Peterson.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPE.ll.L
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction for
Forcible Sexual Abuse and the matter remanded to the
Fourth Judicial District Court for a new trial upon
the grounds and for the reasons stated herein.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 24, 1976, at approximately 9:00 p.m.,
Mrs. Sandy Murphy, a resident of Orem, Utah, was
allegedly attacked sexually as she walked home from
a church meeting.

A man, later identified as Defendant,

allegedly approached her from behind, put his hand over
her mouth, pushed her to the ground, and put his hand
up under her dress, coming into contact with her
genitals, through her underwear.

Mrs. Murphy screamed,

a light went on in a nearby house, and the alleged
assailant ran off.

On the evening of April 7, 1976,

Michael Don Peterson was approached by a police officer
while walking westbound on 200 North in Orem.

The

police officer asked him for identification, found
that he matched the description and the name of someone being sought for questioning, and asked him to
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accompany him to the police station for that questioning.
In the course of the evening, Defendant gave a statement
indicating that he was the man who had attacked Mrs.
Murphy, and that he had done so out of sexual desire.
A competent psychologist testified in the trial, that

Mr. Peterson's subnormal intelligence and desire to
please, could have caused him to confess to a crime he
did not commit.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE OBJECTION
OF THE PROSECUTOR TO DEFENDANT'S LINE OF QUESTIONING
REGARDING THE ARREST PROCEDURE.
Plaintiff's second witness was Officer Terry Taylor
of the Orem City Police Department.

He was questioned

as to how Mr. Peterson came to be in the Orem Police
Station on the evening of April 7, 1976.

His testimony

was that he pulled along side of the Defendant as he was
out walking, and asked him to produce identification,
because he was looking for saneone who fit the description of Defendant.

His testimony was further, that upon

finding that the Defendant matched the description and
name of a person being sought, he was asked to go to the
police station with the police officer, and did so
willingly, an arrest not being made.
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Subsequent evidence, adduced on cross-examination,
shows that a police report was filed in the immediate
case, showing that the suspect

~as

a white male about

16 years of age, 6 ft. tall and clean shaven.

It is

apparent from that information, that the Defendant in
this case did not match the description of the person
being sought on this matter.

Defendant is 24 years

of age and has worn a mustache for years.

Further

questioning brought out the fact that Defendant was
being sought regarding another matter.

Counsel for

the defense thereupon attempted to question Officer
Taylor on whether the other matter was a felony or
misdemeanor.
(TR 23).

An

objection at that time was sustained.

It is Defendant's position that the sus-

taining of that objection was prejudicial to Defendant's
adequate defense.

Defendant contends that there was an

arrest at this time, and that no voluntary action on
the part of the Defendant was responsible for his being
present in the police station.

If, of course, the

Defendant was questioned and picked up because of a
misdemeanor, as it is Defendant's information that he
was, the questioning and detention of Defendant was
illegal.

§76-13-3 U.C.A. (1953) sets out the circum-

stances in which an ~rrest is legal.

If a warrant has

been issued it must be shown to the person arrested.
-4-
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If a warrant is not used, the person must have committed
a public offense in the Officer's presence, or there
must be reasonable cause.to suspect the person of a
felony.

It is very possible, that if questioning had

been allowed to proceed along the line, it would have
been brought out that Defendant was actually detained
and questioned on the basis of misdemeanor reports,
something that is patently illegal.

It may well have

further brought to light, that there was no reasonable
cause whatsoever to suspect the Defendant of the crime
in question in this instance.

Defendant shortly after

the objection, asked that the jury be dismissed and
made a motion to dismiss.

The trial court may well

have been correct in failing to dismiss the case on the
basis of the information it had, but it erred in not
allowing the requested evidence in.

There, of course,

was a disagreement as to whether the Defendant was
forcibly detained, but that entire question should have
been decided only after the facts were in.

If an

illegal arrest was made, any evidence obtained as a
result of it, including Defendant's statement, would
be

inadmissable, as the Supreme Court of the United

States has ruled in Davis v. Mississippi, 349 U.S. 721
(1969).

-s-
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DEFENDANT'S
STATEMENT, GIVEN ORALLY, AND NEVER SWORN TO OR WRITTEN
DOWN, TO BE ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE IN THE TRIAL.
The record of the trial itself, shows no objection
or motions made in an attempt to keep out the Defendant's statement.

This matter was, however, fully

argued in a pre-trial hearing.

Defendant, because of

time limitations, and because of lack of knowledge as
to what was contained in the trial transcript, has not
ordered a transcript of the pre-trial hearing.

If,

however, the court deems it necessary to decide on
this point, a copy can be ordered.

Defendant's conten-

tion is that Defendant was questioned, only after an
illegal detention, in that illegal pressure was put on
the Defendant at that time.

The police officers who

were present at the time of. questioning, admit to
suggesting phrases to the Defendant, (TR 36) and to
telling the Defendant that he might as well confess,
because he could be identified with certainty by the
victim.

(TR 34) •

In fact, the information from the

police report indicated that they were not at all sure
that he would be so identified.

This, then, was not

mere questioning, but a concerted attempt to suggest
to Mr. Peterson that he had done what they only vaguely
-6-
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suspected he had done.

Testimony introduced by Defendant

(TR 73 - TR 79) indicates that the Defendant is in the
lowest 11 1/2 % of the adult population in intellectual
ability.

The expert testimony also indicated that some-

one in this range of intellectual ability is more easily
persuasable than is a normal adult.

These items of

evidence, when taken together, indicate that there is a
distinct possibility of Defendant's will being overcome,
and that indeed a confession to untruth may have been
obtained.

The Supreme Court of the United States, in

Miranda v. Arizona, 884 U.S. 436 (1966), made it quite
clear that the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States means exactly what it says.

That is

that a Defendant cannot be forced to testify against
himself, and to be the main source of evidence against
himself.

Defendant, in this case, did not sign a

written statement.

His refusal to do so raises a dis-

tinct possiblity that his refusal was based on its
falsity.
and the

The means of obtaining information used here
con~ent

of the statement are so suspicious and

under contention, that the court should refuse to admit
the statement and force the police to do what the
constitution says they should do - prove the case without
relying on Defendant to give them their evidence.

l

-7-
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING A MISTRIAL
BASED UPON THE PREJUDICIAL MISCONDUCT OF THE PROSECUTING
ATTORNEY ON CROSS-EXAMINATION.
In the course of the trial the County Attorney
the Defendant's wife, a defense witness:

asked

"To your

knowledge, has he (the Defendant, Michael Don Peterson)
ever been convicted of a felony involving dishonesty?"
(TR 71)

Before Defendant's wife could answer the

question, the jury was dismissed and counsel were
invited into chambers.

The prosecution, unable to find

authority for such questioning, discontinued it.
Both the Utah Code Annotated and the Utah Rules
of Evidence contain provisions relating to the above
question.
Utah Code Annotated §78-24-9 provides':

"But a

·witness must answer as to the fact of his previous
conviction of a felony. "
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 21, provides:
"Evidence of the conviction of a witness for a crime
not'involving dishonesty or false statement shall be
inadmissable for the purpose of impairing his credibility except as otherwise provided by statute."
The law is clear that such questioning is not
proper, and the court supported the law.

The problem,

-8-
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however, is that the question was in before anything
could be done, and it left the jury with an impression
that the Defendant was indeed a dishonest person.

No

amount of warning to disregard the question, could
erase the effect.
It is the duty of the Appellate Court to determine
if such misconduct was prejudicial enough to result in
a miscarriage of justice.

At the outset, counsel has

the duty to give the trial court the opportunity to
correct an error before asking the reviewing court to
reverse the verdict and judgment thereon.
Perkins, 272 P.2d 185, 2 U2d 266.

Pettingill v.

It is to be noted

that at the time counsel moved for a mistrial based
upon prejudicial questioning that the court was evidently willing to instruct the jury to disregard the
question or to otherwise correct or cure the misconduct.

(TR 90)

But the damage had been done.

Sur-

rounding jurisdictions have spoken to this very
point.

People v. Lyons, 303 P.2d 329, 47 C.2d 311,

stated that where misconduct of the prosecuting
attorney is of such character it cannot be purged of
its harmful effect by an admonition, it will be
considered as possible g.rounds for reversal in cases
where no objection was made or admonition requested
on behalf of the Defendant.
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What is the influence upon the jury of the fact
that the Defendant may have been convicted of past
felonies?

That is precisely the question.

Misconduct

of a district attorney does not merit reversal unless
it is so flagrantly and obviously prejudicial that
neither a retraction nor a rebuke from the court can
destroy its influence, so holds a recent California
case.

People v. Seely, 171 P.2d 529, 75 C.A.2d 525;

certiorari denied Seely v. Heinze, 68 s.ct. 147, 332
U.S.819, 92 L.Ed. 396.
Most California decisions have held that such
misconduct is grounds for a reversal where the miscpnduct. may have turned the scales against the Defendant.
People v. Lyons, People v. Carr, 329 P.2d 746, 163
C.A.2d 568; People v. Ford, 200 P.2d 867, 89 C.A.2d
467; In People v. Gibson, 332 P.2d 113, 165 C.A.2d 685
held that the court must resolve doubts in the Defendant's favor as to whether the alleged misconduct was
prejudicial enough to have effected the conviction.
While wide latitude should be permitted in crossexarnination, it must not be extended to permit injection of a matter which is otherwise inadrnissable.
Buchanan v. Nye, 275 P.2d 767, 128 C.A.2d 582.
A recent Oklahoma case

holds

that a "convic-

tion will not be reversed for alleged misconduct of a
-10-
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prosecuting attorney asking incompetent questions on
cross-examination unless the Appellate Court can see
that the prosecuting attorney was guilty of misconduct
influencing the verdict against the accused."
Bilbrey v. State, 135 P.2d 999, 76 Okl.Cr 249.
The mere mention of felony convictions, with or
without instructions to disregard the question,
couldn't help but influence the impaneled jury members.
POINT IV
NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED THAT THE

DEFENDAN~

"TOUCHED" THE PLAINTIFF'S GENITALS AND THUS ALL '!'HE
ELEMENTS OF THE COMPLAINT WERE NOT MET.
In answer to the question as to whether her
genitals were actually touched, Sandy MUrphy answered
in the affirmative, but she continued:

"It was, it

wasn't under my underwear, but he was on top, you
know.

It was under my dress and my slip but not

under my underwear."

(TR 17)

It was found that at

all times there was a layer of clothinq between the
Defendant's hand and Sandy Murphy's genitals.
The Complaint is explicit.

(TR 17)

" .•• the said Michael

Don Peterson, •.• touched the genitals of another ••• "
No evidence was ever produced that he touched her
genitals.

-11-
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It is simply reasonable to assume that the legislature meant to prohibit actions which are more serious
than a simple touching of another person through their
clothing.

This is borne out by the language of the

statute which requires a touching of the anus or any
part of the genitals.

The anus, according to Webster's

New World Dictionary, is "the opening at the lower end
of the alimentary canal."

It is significant that the

legislature used the word anus, and not a word describing the entire buttocks.

It is, of course, impossible

to touch the anus without removing the clothing.

It

is clearly also impossible to touch the genitals, the
actual sexual organs, without removing the clothing.
Webster's New World Dictionary defines "touch" in the
following manner:

11

1. To put the hand, etc. on.

2. To bring or come into contact with."

It cannot

seriously be argued that, even believing the alleged
victim's story in its entirety, Defendant came into
contact with her genitals.

Jury instruction number 9,

dealing with "touch" defined it as "to perceive by
means of tactile sense, the tactile sense being perceptible by touch or relating to the sense of touch."
Defendant's requested instruction number 1, which
instructs the jury that in order to find the Defendant
guilty of the crime charged, that you must find that
-12-
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he actually touched the genitals of Mrs. Murphy and
did not simply touch her clothing" is an instruction
that clearly states the legislative intent.

That

intent is not likely to be expressed in the instruction by the Court.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ADMITTING TESTIMONY
REGARDING SPECIFIC BEHAVIOR OF THE DEFENDANT TENDING
TO A CRIMINAL STATE.

IT IS NOT WITHIN THE PURVIEW

OF THE TRIAL JUDGE'S DISCRETION TO RULE ON RULE 47
EVIDENCE.

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 47 provides:
Subject to Rule 48, when a trait of a person's character is relevant as tending to prove his conduct on a
specified occasion, such trait may be proved in the
same manner as provided by Rule 46, except that (a)
evidence of specific instances of conduct other than
evidence of convictions of a crime which tends to
prove the trait to be bad shall be inadmissable, and
(b) in a criminal action evidence of a trait of an
accused's character as tending to prove his guilt or
innocence of the offense charged, (i) may not be
excluded by the judge under Rule 45 if offered by the
accused to prove his innocence, and (ii) if offered
by the prosecution to prove his guilt, may be admitted
-13-
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only after the accused has introduced evidence of his
good character.

Rule 46, which is referred to in

Rule 47, states "when a person's character or a trait
of his character is in issue, it may be proved by
testimony in the form of opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of the
person's conduct, subject however, to the limitations
of Rule 47 and 48."
In this instance, Defense counsel introduced
evidence of Defendant's character trait of being a
practical joker.

Evidence was also introduced tending

to show a normal sexual development and character.
The evidence was in the form of opinion, evidence of
reputation and evidence of specific instances of his
conduct, and was testified to by members of Defendant's
family.

Webster's New World Dictionary defines

character as:

"a distinctive trait:" "one's person-

ality;11 "moral strength; 11 and "reputation."

The

evidence obtained in this matter was clearly proper,
and was clearly relevant to whether his version of the
facts should be believed.

When, however, further

evidence was attempted, the court sustained the prosecution's objection.

(TR 82-85)

Rule 47 clearly

removes this matter from the Court's discretion, and
it was prejudicial to an adequate defense, that the
-14-
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r
questioning was stopped.
While this specific question has not, to the best
of counsel's knowledge, been decided, Appellate Courts
have held that relevant evidence must be admitted,
even if it is weak.

People v. Collier, 111

215, 295

p 898.

The Court erred in not allowing evidence which
was crucial to Defendant's defense strategy.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court should be
reversed,and the charges against Defendant should be
dismissed.

In the alternative, Defendant should be

granted a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH
MULLINER & MCCULLOUGH
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant
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